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Articles

Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons:
The Elaboration of a Common Law of
International Transactions
THOMAS

E. CARBONNEAU*

With the growth of international trade, arbitration has emerged
as the preferred remedy for resolving private international commercial disputes.' In fact, among major Western legal systems such as
* Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the Eason-Weinmann Center for
Comparative Law, Tulane University. Dipl6me Sup~rieur d'Etudes Frangaises, Universit6 de
Poitiers, 1971; A.B. Bowdoin College, 1972; J.D., University of Virginia, 1978; M.A., 1979;
M.A., Oxford University, 1979; LL.M., Columbia University, 1979; J.S.D., 1984. This article
is a sequel to Carbonneau, ArbitralAdjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its Remedial
andSubstantive Status in TransnationalCommerce, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 33 (1984). Minor parts
of this earlier publication are reproduced here with permission.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professors Willis Reese, Charles Szladits,
and George Bermann of Columbia University whose comments and observations during my
doctoral defense motivated the writing of this article. Thanks are also in order for my friend
and colleague, Professor Paul Barron of Tulane University, who read the manuscript in its
various stages and provided invaluable suggestions for its improvement. Any errors, omissions
or other imperfections are, of course, my own responsibility.
1. Without arbitration or other alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, such as conciliation or mediation, which are now also starting to flourish in the international sector, the only
recourse for parties to an international commercial contract in the event of a dispute is to
litigate before national courts. Attempts at negotiation in all likelihood would fail, given the
breakdown of the contractual relationship. Recourse to national court adjudication is also
problematic given the usual choice of forum and choice of law problems.
Traditionally, commentators advance three contradistinctive theories to explain the nature of arbitral adjudication. Each theory emphasizes a particular view of the relationship
between the state and private individuals and expresses a different attitude regarding private
and public authority. A fourth theory adds a more contemporary dimension to the debate by
envisaging arbitration as a transnational process. See J. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 51-61 (1978). For a discussion of this general topic, see
P. FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1965); J. ROBERT & T.
CARBONNEAU, THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION (1983); J. RUBELLIN-DEVICHI,
L'ARBITRAGE: NATURE JURIDIQUE, DROIT INTERNE ET DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt
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those of England, the United States and France,2 statutory and decisional law developments indicate a nearly complete acceptance of international arbitral adjudication. This recognition of arbitration has
resulted in the elaboration of agreed upon rules, relating to arbitral
procedure and the enforcement of awards, which are given uniform
legal recognition and enforcement by domestic legal systems, either as
provisions in international conventions or as principles of national
statutory or decisional law. These rules, in effect, represent an international consensus on arbitration and constitute a normative procedural policy of transnational proportions.
A fully functional transnational adjudicatory process, however,
must not only provide certainty as to remedial relief but also fulfill a
substantive mission. Professor Rene David properly characterizes the
implications of the continued evolution of the international arbitral
process when he states:
We must not, in effect, succumb to illusions. Arbitration in
current international practice is neither arbitration "properly speaking" which is disposed to the application of a national law nor amiable composition as it was conceived of at
(1965); see also Kerr, InternationalArbitrationv. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164 (1980); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1961); Wilner, Determining the
Law Governing Performance in InternationalCommercialArbitration: A ComparativeStudy,
19 RUTGERS L. REv. 646, 650-52 (1965). See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (C. Schmitthoffed. 1983); J. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1979). For what is perhaps the most lucid and thoughtful contemporary statement of the problems and issues, see de Vries, InternationalCommercial Arbitration:
A ContractualSubstitute for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REv. 42 (1982).
2. For example, the English Arbitration Act of 1979, Arb. Act, 1979, ch. 42, reprintedin
5 Y.B. COM. ARB. 239-46 (P. Sanders ed. 1980), has minimized the possibility of judicial
intervention by authorizing, save for "special category" contracts, exclusion agreements in
"nondomestic" arbitration. See Carbonneau, ArbitralAdjudication:A ComparativeAssessment
of Its Remedial and SubstantiveStatus in TransnationalCommerce, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 33, 44
n.39, 44-45 & 63-65 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Arbitral Adjudication]. In the United States,
the 1970 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1976), implements the provisions of the
1958 New York Convention [Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38]. This
Act and landmark court cases, such as Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh'g
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) and Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395
(1967), demonstrate that the basic institutions of the legal system perceive international arbitral adjudication as a process which avoids intractable jurisdictional, choice-of-law and other
problems in international contracts and thereby is indispensable to the vitality of international
trade. See supra Arbitral Adjudication at 68-76. By way of further illustration, the French
Decree of May 12, 1981, No. 81-500, 1981 J.O. 1380, 1399, while echoing the tone and substance of the developments in England and in the United States, actually constitutes a more
liberal and advanced statement of domestic policy on international commercial arbitration by
recognizing it asan "a-national" process. See supraArbitralAdjudicationat 77 n.175, 77-79 &
84.
3. See, eg., Arbitral Adjudication supra note 2.
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the beginning by the canon law scholars. It is much more
an aspiration toward a new type of law.4
The critical question regarding the future development of international arbitral adjudication, then, is whether it can produce substantive legal principles and, in effect, stimulate and foster the
development of a common law of international transactions.
This article argues that "reasoned awards," or awards accompanied by written opinions based on law, are an appropriate and useful
instrument for fulfilling the normative potential of transnational arbitration and satisfying the "aspiration toward a new type of law."'
Reasoned awards could serve as a means of assessing the arbitrators'
ability to assure the parties of a principled decisional basis. Furthermore, reasoned awards could act as nonbinding persuasive authority,
gradually defining the basic substantive tenets of an international law
merchant. The publication of such awards and their subsequent enforcement by national courts (thus confirming the content of the
awards provided the awards comply with a limited notion of substantive international public policy) might lead to the creation of a general
arbitral principle of stare decisis possessing a transnational stature.
I.

REASSESSING THE ROLE OF REASONED AWARDS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PRACTICE

The prevalent practice has been to render international arbitral
awards without explaining the reasons by which the decision was
reached. This practice has its antecedents in antiquated English common law, where the writ procedure provided for having an arbitral
award reviewed on the merits by a court for an error of law. To avoid
such review, it became commonplace for English arbitral tribunals to
render awards without providing the underlying reasons. 6 This English practice eventually was adopted in the United States, although its
adoption appears to have occurred in an unstated and implied fashion.' French law, on the other hand, mandated as a matter of public
policy that domestic arbitral awards be rendered with reasons.' Beginning in the late nineteenth century, however, French courts recognized and enforced foreign awards that lacked reasons if the
4. R. DAVID, L'ARBITRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL t 117 (1982) (author's translation).

5. Id.
6. See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 2, at 40-41.
7. Id.at 102.
8. See Carbonneau, The Elaborationof a French Court Doctrine On InternationalCommercialArbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial Creativity, 55 TUL. L. REv. 1, 16-20
(1980).
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applicable foreign law of procedure permitted the rendering of such
awards. 9
In the relevant decisional law,' 0 the French courts justified their

divergent posture toward international awards (which could be enforced despite a lack of reasons) and domestic awards (which needed
to be rendered with reasons in order to be legally valid) by claiming
commercial necessity. The courts emphasized that the English prac-

tice of rendering awards without reasons had been adopted by a majority of countries in the international commercial community, and
most importantly in U.S. arbitral practice. At that time, AngloAmerican interests exercised a veritable hegemony in world commerce, and arbitration clauses already figured prominently in interna9. Id. At the time these decisions were rendered, the term "international arbitration"
apparently had not yet come into vogue. The courts consistently characterized as "foreign"
those arbitrations which took place abroad between parties of different nationalities and those
arbitral awards which were rendered by arbitral tribunals sitting in jurisdictions other than
France. Such a determination was reached even though the arbitral awards basically involved
the resolution of international commercial disputes. No attempt was made by the courts or
legal scholars to draw a distinction between foreign and international arbitral awards; the notion of foreign arbitrations and arbitral awards appeared to cover both categories.
This lack of conceptual differentiation between the two terms still exists to some extent.
For example, some of the scholarly literature still refers to the enforcement of foreign, not
international, arbitral awards, but it is evident that the discussion is meant to apply to both
types of awards. This lack of distinction between the notion of foreign and international arbitral awards is supported by the formal title of the 1958 New York Convention, infra note 18,
which refers to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, although the Convention was intended to be the universal charter of international arbitration. The latest arbitral convention, the 1961 European Convention, however, refers to international arbitration.
European Convention On International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S.
364, T.I.A.S. No. 7041 (1963-64) (Geneva).
A reading of more recent French judicial opinions relating to international arbitration
reveals that contemporary French courts are speaking in terms of international arbitral awards
and not foreign awards, again blurring the distinction between the two. Many legal commentators have abandoned efforts to maintain a workable distinction between the two types of
awards. In effect, what were referred to formerly as foreign awards are now being categorized
as international arbitral awards.
The distinction seems to be of limited utility. It is unlikely to surface in the context of
arbitral awards rendered abroad and sought to be enforced in France because the vast majority
of such awards involve international commercial interests. The distinction could become more
important in circumstances in which a French domestic arbitration and arbitral award involved the interest of international commerce. Here, the liberal regime for international commercial arbitration could apply to this "domestic" award because the subject matter of the
arbitration involved the interests of international commerce.
Nevertheless, some French legal scholars have insisted upon maintaining the distinction,
despite its lack of practical significance in actual litigation. For an extensive discussion of this
distinction, see, e.g., Fragistras, Arbitrage dtrangeret arbitrageinternationalen droitpriv6, 49
REVUE CRITIQUE DE Dnorr INTERNATIoNAL PRIVft [R.C.D.I.P.] 1 (1960); Fouchard,

Quand un arbitrageest-il international, [1970] REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE [REv. ARB.] 59;
Goldman, Les conflits de lois dans l'arbitrageinternationalde droit privd, 1 RECEUIL DEs
CouPs (HAGUE ACAD. INT'L L.) 359 (1963).
10. See generally Carbonneau supra note 8.
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tional contracts. The French courts concluded, therefore, that a
malleable position, minimizing the reach of domestic public policy requirements relating to arbitration, was indispensable to the advancement of French commercial interests. Judicial inflexibility on this
score would have rendered French parties essentially incapable of effectively engaging in foreign trade transactions. 1
Other factors, pertaining specifically to transactional concerns,
may have contributed more directly to making the practice of rendering awards without reasons a necessary and accepted feature of the
emerging international arbitral process. Commercial parties may
have considered such awards to be a viable means of promoting the
efficiency and economy of arbitral proceedings. Unreasoned awards
also eliminated the possibility of a review on the merits by national
courts, institutions dreaded for their potential parochialism and reputed inability to comprehend the emerging needs of transnational
commerce. Given the reasoning which characterized the French case
law, however, one suspects that these considerations evolved from,
rather than originated with, the practice of unreasoned awards in international arbitration.
As the French court opinions 12 suggest, fortuitous historical circumstances seem to account more properly for the development and
prevalence of international awards without reasons. In keeping with
the creation of other juridical institutions, U.S. arbitration law and
practice at their inception may have relied, unthinkingly and unjustifiably, upon the English example to formulate rules regarding the arbitral award. English practice was inextricably linked to longstanding
English distrust of arbitral adjudication and a concomitant tradition
of judicial review of the merits of awards; English arbitrators rendered awards without reasons to avoid judicial second-guessing of
their determinations. English courts were, as a matter of public policy, steadfastly committed to requiring substantive legal accuracy
from arbitral tribunals, and permitted the practice to stand, yet
thwarted it indirectly (but effectively) by having recourse to the stated
case procedure.' 3 That procedure, in effect, allowed the courts to en11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Roze v. Victory Hill Consol. Gold Mining Co., Cour d'appel, Paris, Apr.
10, 1894,21 JOURNAL DU DROrr INTERNATIONAL-CLUNET 878 (1894); Soci6t6 Veuve Henri

Broutchoux v. Soci6t6 Elmassion, Cass. Civ. ire, June 14, 1960, 49 R.C.D.I.P. 393 (1960); see
also Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 17-21 & 39-43.
13. The stated case procedure originated with the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854,
17 & 18 VIcT., cited in Lord Hacking, The "Stated Case" Abolished: The United Kingdom
Arbitration Act of 1979, 14 INT'L L. 95 (1980). This procedure authorized arbitrators to state
an award, in whole or in part, to a court as a special case, requesting that the court assess the
legal substance of the award. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 VIcT., ch. 125, § V,
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gage in a review on the merits of arbitral awards. Despite attempted
reform in 1950, the systemic distrust of the arbitral process and the
substantive reviewability of awards continued in England until the enactment of the 1979 Arbitration Act. 14
In the U.S. context, transplanting the procedure of unreasoned

awards was both inappropriate and unnecessary; the essential components of the English experience were lacking. Although U.S. courts
initially were as skeptical of arbitration as their English counterparts,
that attitude was discredited as early as 1925 with the Federal Arbitration Act: legislation symbolizing the coming-of-age of the U.S. ar-

bitral process and the initiation of its autonomous national
development. 5 Moreover, the United States did not have a historical
pattern consecrating the judicial supervision of the merits of awards.16
Nineteenth century U.S. court opposition to arbitration centered
upon attacking the validity and enforceability
of arbitral agreements,
17
not the substantive correctness of awards.
Unreasoned awards served no meaningful purpose in the U.S.
arbitral process. Had the practice of unreasoned awards violated the

U.S. notion of adjudicatory public policy, some means would have
been devised to undermine the practice, as was achieved in England
with the creation of the stated case procedure. That, however, did not
happen. The inevitable conclusion is that the U.S. incorporation of
at 978. Although the authority to state a special case resided with the arbitrators, the parties
to the arbitration could revoke the arbitrators' discretionary authority in their agreement.
Eventually, as the practice surrounding the remedy evolved, this revocation power was eliminated. The special case procedure covered any question of law arising during the arbitral
proceeding. In 1922, the Court of Appeal in Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2
K.B. 478 [C.A.], held that the parties could not revoke the court's authority to require the
arbitrator to state an award in the form of a special case, thereby eliminating the possiblity of
excluding judicial review by contract. This ruling was later changed by the Arbitration Act,
1979, 27 & 28 Eliz. 2, ch. 42, § 3(1), to allow the parties to contract away judicial review once
arbitration had begun.
The ostensible purpose of the Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, reprintedin 2
INT'L COM. ARB., Doc. VII, E. 1, 129-49 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1983), was to recognize arbitration as an acceptable alternative adjudicatory procedure. The distinguishing feature of the
1950 Act, which contrasted sharply with its more liberal provisions, was its provision for judicial review of the legal substance of awards. The 1950 Act provided for fairly extensive judicial intervention in the arbitral proceeding and in regard to the award. For example, the Act
adopted the stated case procedure, which became the principal mechanism for the judicial
review of awards. The statutory procedure included both a "consultative case," applying to
requests for judicial guidance made during the arbitral proceeding, and "alternative final
awards," applying to the arbitrator's statement of questions at the end of the proceeding.
14. Arbitration Act, 1979, 27 & 28 Eliz. 2, ch. 42, reprintedin 5 Y.B. CoM. ARM 239-46
(P. Sanders ed. 1980).
15. Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 2, at 46-50.
16. Id
17. Id
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the English practice was a historical anomaly. It survived because it
was transplanted into a total vacuum, and thereafter gained a measure
of functional utility by responding to the need of the process for transactional efficiency. The historical rationale underlying the procedure
and the motives for its adoption were completely severed from its operational reality.
Given the preeminence of U.S. business interests in the early
stages of the development of international commerce, other countries,
such as France, may have felt obligated to acquiesce to the established
rules of U.S. arbitral practice. The international subservience to the
practice of unreasoned awards, based on a sense of expediency, was
no more astute than the national adoption of the practice in the
United States. No one peered through the veil of acceptance which
surrounded the practice of rendering awards without reasons and discovered its underlying gravamen: it was exclusively rooted in the special, indeed unique, circumstances of English domestic arbitral
practice. While process factors may have arisen subsequently to validate, to some extent, the initial integration of unreasoned awards in
domestic arbitral practice, the incorporation of the procedure into the
international arbitral process has been achieved on an unstudied and
therefore most questionable basis; hence, both its theoretical and
practical utility in that context must be reconsidered.
There has been some significant contemporary evolution in precisely that direction. Although the 1958 New York Convention 18 is
silent on the question of whether awards should be reasoned, the 1961
European Convention 19 and the United Nations Commission on International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) rules 0 establish a pre18. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
openedfor signature,June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, codified in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1982). For a list of implementing acts, see A. VAN DEN BERG,
THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, Annex C, at 417 (1981).
19. On Dec. 16, 1966, France ratified the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 12, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364, T.I.A.S. No. 7041. Article VIII of the
Convention provides that:
[t]he parties shall be presumed to have agreed that reasons shall be given for the
award unless they (a) either expressly declare that reasons shall not be given; or (b)
have assented to an arbitral procedure under which it is not customary to give reasons for awards, provided that in this case neither party requests before the end of
the hearing, or if there has not been a hearing then before the making of the award,
that reasons be given.
The European Convention, while open to non-European signatories, has not had the widespread success of the New York Convention. Some 18 countries, including France, Italy, the
Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, have ratified the Convention. See J. ROBERT,
L'ARBITRAGE DROIT INTERNE DROIT INTERNATIONAL Psuvf 415 (5th ed. 1983).
20. Article 32(3) of the UNCITRAL rules provides that "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall
state the reasons upon which the award is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[23:579

sumption favoring the rendering of awards with reasons. This
presumption, which can be defeated only by an express party agreement to the contrary, has a number of evident advantages. First, it
gives the process a true adjudicatory character, making arbitration in
yet another respect the equivalent of judicial proceedings. Second, it
guarantees that the parties will have a statement explaining the tribunal's ultimate determination. If there is subsequent, albeit limited,
judicial confirmation of the merits of awards, the parties also are assured that their award has complied with a minimum standard of substantive due process. Third, although commercial customs and trade
usages usually influence the application of law in arbitral proceedings,
the practice of rendering awards with reasons works in tandem with
the general procedural mandate that arbitral tribunals make decisions
in accord with substantive rules of law.
These factors may point to a fourth reason coinciding with, yet
transcending in importance, the foregoing three reasons that justify
adoption of such a practice. To develop creatively, arbitration must
maintain its preferred remedial status while improving its ability to
generate substantive international commercial law norms. To avoid
the pitfall of transforming arbitration into the equivalent of adjudication before national courts, and at the same time to gain the full benefit of the consensus surrounding arbitration as a remedial alternative
to judicial adjudication, arbitral decisional law based on a form of
transnational stare decisis must emerge. Such arbitral decisional law
would satisfy a quest for further stabilization in the international
commercial community. Professor Cremades' analysis attests to the
fact that current arbitral practice already has presaged such a
development:
[I]t is fair to say that arbitral decision-making has introduced a new commercial ethic into the international business community. The constant flow of arbitration awards is
nourishing a new legal order that is born of, and particularly
suited to, regulating world business. Trade usages and custom, as well as professional regulations, will attain the status
of law as they become embodied in arbitral decision
making.2 1
are to be given." The rules are reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

Doe. 1.10, at 181, 195 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1983); see also 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 161, 168 (1977).
21. Cremades, The Impact of InternationalArbitration on the Development of Business
Law, 31 AM. J. CoMP. L. 526, 533 (1983).
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ARBITRATION AND REASONED AWARDS
THE RESULTS ACHIEVED WITH REASONED AWARDS IN
ACTUAL PRACTICE

Maritime Arbitration

A practice of rendering awards with reasons, to some degree, has
already emerged in one specialized area of international trade: mari-

time arbitration. The customary practice in maritime arbitration is to
render reasoned awards that have a recognized precedential value.2 2

The maritime industry functions on basically standardized contracts
that need uniform construction in order to insure some measure of
predictability for industry transactions. Once rendered, the awards
are published, which reinforces the stature of awards as applicable
precedents. Since there is basic agreement that the industry's need for
transactional predictability and stability can be achieved through uniform arbitral interpretation by a cohesive corps of expert arbitrators,
there is little, if any, need for recourse to the judicial review of the
merits of the awards.
While the perimeters of the present study permit drawing only
tentative conclusions, a perusal of published maritime arbitral awards
indicates that there is a high degree of substantive adjudicatory uniformity on major issues which typically arise in maritime litigation.
Moreover, although maritime arbitral decisional law is built around a
nucleus of specialized conventional transactions, it nonetheless reveals
that international traders do favor, or at least accept, a system of alternate dispute resolution which yields principled rules and achieves
greater substantive predictability. It also illustrates that as the transactional setting becomes more formalized, the resort to the remedial
process begins to generate norms which, under the aegis of the more
structured transactional format, are suitable for systematic adjudicatory application. Finally, despite minority positions and variations in
the content of some awards (inconsistencies which are characteristic
of any form of adjudication), reasoned arbitral adjudication in the
maritime area has resulted in the elaboration of meaningful legal principles for dealing with the disputes that accompany the breakdown of
contractual relationships.23
B.

InternationalChamber of Commerce Arbitration

Because its processes touch upon a wider variety of commercial
disputes, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) institutional ar22. See O'Brien, Maritime Arbitration, 14 FORUM 222, 227 (1978-79).
23. For a comprehensive survey of the maritime arbitral decisional law, see SocIETY
MARITIME ARBITRATORS, AWARD SERVICE (Multivolume series).
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The

ICC experience reveals that transactional standardization, similar to
that which has occurred in the maritime field, also exists in other areas of international trade. There are, for example, form contracts for
joint venture dealings, licensing agreements, and turn-key construction operations. The process of institutional arbitration which provides a remedy for the generality of international commercial
disputes, additionally affords the possibility of uniform substantive
adjudication which undoubtedly would enhance the stability of those
transactions that make up international trade.
The ICC Rules of Arbitration24 are silent with respect to whether
reasoned awards should be rendered or published. Available reports
on ICC awards, however, indicate that reasoned awards are not at all
uncommon in actual ICC practice. Many of these awards are being
published on a regular basis, either in full or in extract form, as part
25
of a continuing commentary in the Journaldu DroitInternational
24. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION pt. I, §§ 1.01-1.08, at 1-15; app. II, at 1 (1984).

25. See Cour d'arbitrage de la Chambre de commerce internationale chronique des
sentences arbitrales,101 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL-CLUNET 874 (Thompson &

Derains reps. 1974) [101 CLUNET]; Cour d'arbitragede la Chambre de commerce internationale chronique des sentences arbitrales, 102 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL-CLUNET
916 (Derains rep. 1975) [102 CLUNET]; Cour d'arbitragede la Chambrede commerce internationale chronique des sentences arbitrales, 103 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL-

CLUNET 968 (Der.ins rep. 1976) [103 CLUNET]; Cour d'arbitragede la Chambre de commerce
internationalechronique des sentences arbitrales, 104 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL-

CLUNET 931 (Derains rep. 1977) [104 CLUNET]; Courd'arbitragede la Chambre de commerce
internationalechronique des sentences arbitrales, 105 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL-

CLUNET 977 (Derains rep. 1978) [105 CLUNET]; Courd'arbitragede la Chambre de commerce
internationalechronique des sentences arbitrales,106 JOURNAL Du DROrr INTERNATIONAL-

CLUNET 989 (Derains rep. 1979) [106 CLUNET]; Cour d'arbitragede la Chambre de commerce
internationalechronique des sentences arbitrales,107 JOURNAL DU DROrr INTERNATIONAL-

CLUNET 949 (Derains rep. 1980) [107 CLUNET]; Cour d'arbitragede la Chambre de commerce
internationalechronique des sentences arbitrales,108 JOURNAL DU DROrr INTERNATIONAL-

CLUNET 913 (Derains rep. 1981) [108 CLUNET]; Cour d'arbitragede la Chambre de commerce
internationalechronique des sentences arbitrales,109 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL-

CLUNET 967 (Derains rep. 1982) [109 CLUNET]; Courd'arbitragede la Chambrede commerce
internationalechronique des sentences arbitrales,110 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONALCLUNET 889 (Derains & Jarvin reps. 1983) [110 CLUNET].

According to the former Secretary General of the ICC Court of Arbitration, Yves Derains, the ICC selects for publication "[o]nly those awards in which arbitrators have felt least
constrained to apply national law." 104 CLUNET, supra, at 874, 876. In his inaugural introduction to the publication of the ICC award, Derains added the following caveats: that awards
are published with the permission of the parties who determine the extent of editing; that the
ICC does not require its arbitrators to look to precedent; and that ICC arbitrators, as a rule,
are not aware of prior arbitral awards. Id.
Moreover, according to Craig, Park and Paulsson, ICC awards "invariably state reasons."
This allows the parties and the ICC Court of Arbitration "to appraise the thoroughness of the
arbitrators' treatment of the issues." There also appears to be a number of factors which
encourage a wide diversity in the form and content of ICC awards, such as the background of
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Although a full account of the reasoned ICC awards merits a separate

study, a preliminary examination of the substance of the awards rendered during the last ten years reveals that a group of core principles
is beginning to take shape. While the emergence of these principles
conceivably stems from a variety of sources and factors, such as their
presence and predominanace in domestic commercial laws, their development as legal concepts applicable to the regulation of international commercial relationships can be attributed in large measure to
reasoned ICC arbitral adjudication. Again, despite some variations,
the substance of ICC awards is basically consistent.
1. Good Faith
A common law of international contracts, with very definite contours, is beginning to appear. This body of law consists of three different sets of rules: universally acknowledged, natural-law-type
principles; national legal principles adapted to international commercial practices; and more sui generis principles which mirror the pragmatic ethic of the community of international merchants. ICC
awards, for example, hold that parties to international commercial
contracts are under a good faith obligation in their dealings. These
awards further establish that the good faith obligation implies other
duties: the duty to inform the other party of circumstances which
might threaten performance of the contract; the duty to renegotiate
the contract in order to salvage the commercial relationship if circumstances permit; and the duty to mitigate damages in the event of a
breach.2 6
Commercial parties cannot act to the detriment of the other
party without incurring liability in arbitral proceedings. Parties also
the presiding arbitrator (who usually acts as the chief drafter of the award) and whether the
arbitrators are from a civil law or common law jurisdiction. The authors, however, conclude
that the reasoning of awards usually will be characterized by "a certain similarity of approach"
notwithstanding the differences in background among the arbitrators. See W. CRAIG, W.
PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 24, pt. III, § 19.04, at 107.
In domestic practice, some national laws require arbitral awards to be rendered with reasons. See CODE DE PROCf-DURE CIVILE [C. PR. civ.], art. 1471 (Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence
1984)(Fr.); Swiss Intercantonal Arbitration Convention, art. 33(1), approved by Federal Council, Aug. 27, 1969, reprinted in II INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, at 109 (C.

Schmitthoffed. 1983). Moreover, in England, where the practice of unreasoned awards began,
the enactment of the 1979 Arbitration Act initiated "a shift to the system of reasoned awards"
and has given rise to the judicial view "that (except in quality arbitrations) all English arbitrators should give reasons for their awards." Steyn, National Reports: England, 8 Y.B. COM.
ARB. 3, 32 (1983).

26. See, e.g., 103 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2291, at 989; 101 CLUNET, supra
note 25, Sentence No. 2103, at 902; 102 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2216, at 917;
102 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2478, at 923; 102 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence
No. 2139, at 929; 109 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 3344, at 978.
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must act with due diligence in the performance of their obligations.
ICC arbitrators consider the good faith obligation as part of international commercial usages. They apply it as a matter of law in all proceedings.27 The view that good faith is a central element of cohesion
in the operation of international commerce is supported by the generality of international arbitral awards and the accompanying scholarly
commentary, most notably by Professor Cremades:
Arbitral decision-making has developed good faith as an
overriding rule of international contracting. The international business community shares a common desire to increase its field of activity and good faith is the cohesive
element that makes the achievement of such an end possible.
It demands an acceptance of the rules of the game by which
international commerce is played. It is the modus vivendi
that requires a.debtor and creditor to work as partners
rather than as adversaries. Good faith is a regulatory norm
through which arbitrators apply equitable principles as the
supreme rule of contractual interpretation.28
The good faith obligation represents a broad legal principle that
is recognized in most advanced legal systems. Few are likely to argue
that good faith should not apply to contractual conduct. The statement of such a duty in ICC arbitral awards, however, is neither meaningless nor gratuitous. While the content of the rule is not new or
special, it does have considerable importance in the dynamics of the
system in which it operates. Good faith, as understood by international merchants for the special purposes of their activity, now formally applies, as a matter of law, at the transnational level, a domain
of activity which previously was considered at worst to be without
law and at best to be governed by legal provisions suited to domestic
needs. The statement of the rule formally embodies a "new ethic in
international business," 29 the expression of a tacit understanding of
the community of international merchants, without reference to national laws, as to how their specific relations should be conducted.
A broad parallel can be drawn between the statement of these
general obligations in the area of international commerce and the interrelationship of codes and decisional law in civil law jurisdictions.
To some extent, these obligations amount to a code of conduct for
international business transactions, awaiting refinement through more
27. See, e.g., 103 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2291, at 989.
28. See Cremades, supra note 21, at 527.
29. Id. at 526.
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detailed application in the specific content of arbitral cases. They provide, at the very least, an organized substantive framework for initiating principled adjudication which might yield more specific, factbound rules in particular cases.
2.

Mitigation of Damages

The statement and application of the duty to mitigate damages
points to other considerations. The mitigation concept is not formally
recognized in some legal systems, 30 although strong arguments can be
made that it at least has an implied or indirect presence in these systems. While the duty to mitigate may not have the same universal
status as the good faith obligation, it is a commonly adhered to legal
principle. The contribution of reasoned ICC arbitral adjudication is
that, for purposes of international commerce, it eliminates any confusion which might arise from the ambiguous domestic status of the
concept, especially in the event that arbitrators are bound by a domestic law which does not expressly recognize the duty. In this sense, the
reasoned basis of ICC awards transcends the possibly conflicting substance of national legal systems and elaborates an appropriate and unambiguous rule for international commercial transactions.
3.

Renegotiation
The duty to renegotiate 3 1 represents yet a third level of rule elab-

30. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1115 (2d ed. 1977).
31. According to the relevant sources, the duty of parties engaged in an international
contract to undertake the renegotiation of an agreement (the performance of which is jeopardized by dispute) is anchored in the umbrella concept of good faith. See 103 CLUNET, supra
note 25, Sentence No. 2291, at 990 (citing Horsmans & Verwilghen, Conclusion Stabilitiet
Evolution du Contrat iconomique international,in CENTRE CHARLES DE VISSCHER POUR LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, LE CONTRAT ECONOMIQUE INTERNATIONAL STABILITA ET
EVOLUTION 449, 466-67 (1975)).
The obligation incumbent upon contracting parties to act according to the dictates of
good faith in confecting and executing their agreement is recognized as a fundamental provision of the "code" which regulates private international economic conduct. For instance, it
mandates that parties cooperate in the performance of the contract so as not to imperil their
mutual interests which led them originally to enter into the agreement. As a consequence,
whenever circumstances (such as changes in general market conditions relating to demand,
price, or currency value) disrupt performance, parties have a duty to undertake reasonable
efforts to achieve a renegotiation of the agreement before pursuing more formal dispute resolution mechanisms. The tribunal in Sentence No. 2291, supra, states that the duty to renegotiate
has become a customary principle of private international economic relations, further noting
that parties must deploy "normal, useful, and reasonable" diligence in the protection of their
interests. For example, in the event that the performance of a contract is disturbed, partiesthough at the risk of breaching their good faith obligation to make a reasonable attempt at
renegotiation-should not make "hasty and ill-conceived" offers which would unfairly surprise
the other party. Horsmans and Verwilghen, supra, go further in the conceptualization of the
obligation. Seeing pragmatic cooperation as applicable to all stages of the transaction, they
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oration. Unlike the duty to notify the other party of adverse circum-

stances which might threaten performance, it cannot be linked as
directly to the bona fides principle; in contrast to the mitigation concept, it is not an express part of some national juridical cultures. In
the context of ICC awards, the duty to renegotiate has been advanced
as a general obligation which inheres in international economic rela-

tions.32 The recogniton and application of the concept, therefore, represents neither the integration of universal principles nor distillation
of national legal rules. Rather, it is a legal rule specifically designed
for, and responding to, the needs and patterns of conduct that are
prevalent in the community of international merchants. The duty to
renegotiate, derived from international arbitrators' perception of the
particular demands and requirements of private international ecoargue that the joining of good faith with attempts at renegotiation in the context of a breakdown of performance requires that the parties approach such problems with the view that the
conflicts between them should be resolved by fashioning a dialogue that will lead to the creative and effective resolution of disputes. In a word, the duty to renegotiate requires parties to
engage in meaningful practical attempts to salvage the transaction in an arms-length atmosphere.
The description of the duty to renegotiate and its association to the good faith obligation
leave a number of questions unanswered. Although good faith is at the core of the common
law of international transactions, its precise status and role are difficult to conceptualize. Does
acting in one's economic self-interest, for example, by taking advantage of the evolution of
circumstances amount to bad faith? If so, does it constitute bad faith in each and every instance? Assume a situation in which A orders 500 factory parts from B and B delivers 495
parts. During the interval between ordering and delivery, the price of the parts goes down
considerably and A can obtain them from other sources at the reduced price. Would A's
rejection of the contract for B's defective performance constitute a breach of A's good faith
obligation? of its duty to reasonably attempt renegotiation? Should these parties or one of
them be allowed to invoke arbitration pursuant to a valid agreement without first attempting
renegotiation? Would the failure to make a reasonable attempt at renegotiation constitute a
failure to exhaust available mandatory remedies? In the context of an arbitral proceeding, how
would the tribunal sanction a failure to attempt renegotiation? If no sanction is imposed, does
that mean that the duty to renegotiate is unenforceable in the context of binding adjudication
and therefore is not a duty at all? Finally, how do good faith and the duty to renegotiate fit
into the view espoused by the arbitral decisional law that pacta sunt servanda and the strict
adherence to contract terms are cardinal principles of international economic relations?
Answers to these questions can only be adumbrated. At a preliminary level, it should be
underscored that the consensus and ethical givens of international commercial conduct should
provide significant guidance to the resolution of such issues. Moreover, the good faith obligation and the duty to renegotiate apply primarily to the informal and conciliatory phase of the
dispute resolution process largely controlled by the parties and preceding binding arbitral adjudication by third parties. Once arbitration is invoked, different or modified rules motivated by
larger policy and systemic considerations, such as the need to maintain the stability and predictability of transactions, may apply. Although a precise resolution of the issues raised is
unavailable given the current status of arbitral decisional law, the very existence of so many
unanswered questions forcefully indicates that the practice of rendering awards with reasons
needs to become a basic feature of current international arbitral practice. The substance of
such awards may be the only means of effectively articulating and elaborating the basic rules of
international commercial relations.
32. 103 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2291, at 989-90.
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nomic relations as gauged by their general sense of legality and equity,
reflects the most innovative feature of rule creation under ICC arbitral adjudication and perhaps the most authentic part of the emerging
lex mercatoria (law governing commercial transactions).
4. Other Rules
ICC awards have yielded other rules to deal with issues that traditionally arise in international commercial litigation. These rules
generally refine the application of the more broad-gauged principles.
The classical and interrelated doctrines ofpacta sunt servanda (agreements of the parties must be observed), rebussic stantibus (obligations
end when the underlying facts are substantially changed) and force
majeure (irresistable force), for example, are often germane to the adjudication of disputes arising under international commercial contracts. In ICC awards, issues have surfaced especially in regard to the
effect of a change in circumstances upon existing contractual obligations, that is, whether a turn of events, for example, amounts to circumstances of force majeure and excuses the parties from any or
further performance.
In the relevant awards,33 the basic approach adopted by ICC arbitrators has been to attribute a dominant impact to pacta sunt servanda, emphasizing the sanctity of contracts, and to minimize the
applicability of rebus sic stantibus. This approach can be explained by
certain presumptions that ICC arbitrators derive from their reading of
the dynamics of international commercial transactions and then integrate into their reasoning. First, the arbitrators presume that parties
engaged in international contracts are knowledgeable about their
transactions and are aware of the risks such transactions present. Accordingly, parties are expected to include hardship, adaptation, or indexation clauses in their contracts to anticipate possible variations in
circumstances during performance. Given the parties' professional
sophistication as international merchants, ICC arbitrators interpret
party silence about possible future contingencies as a conscious decision to assume the risk of such eventualities.34
In keeping with this approach, ICC arbitrators have taken a
rather restrictive view of force majeure as an excuse for performance. 5 International commercial parties often includeforce majeure
33.
note 25,
34.
note 25,

See. eg., 102 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2139, at 929; 101 CLUNET, supra
Sentence No. 1512, at 904; 104 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2708, at 943.
See, eg, 101 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 1512, at 904; 104 CLUNET, supra
Sentence No. 2708, at 943; 106 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 1990, at 897;
108 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 3130, at 931.
35. See, eg., 101 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2142, at 892; 101 CLUNET, supra
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clauses in their contracts precisely to deal with significant changes in
circumstances which modify or impair the economic value or feasibility of the obligations under their agreement. Some of these clauses
simply amount to a general statement that a force majeure event will
excuse performance, leaving the definition offorce majeure for subsequent determination by an adjudicatory body. Many of these clauses,
however, are slightly more sophisticated. Usually, a clause contains
an enumeration of events which the parties agree will constitute instances of force majeure. The central question of adjudication remains definitional, but is focused more specifically upon whether the
enumerated list of events is exhaustive or merely illustrative.
Rather than refer to national legal rules or those which may apply to the merits of the dispute, ICC arbitrators rule onforce majeure
claims according to general legal principles and the will of the parties.
In ICC arbitrations, the force majeure doctrine functions as part of a
generally applicable body of international commercial law principles.
Given the well-established character of the doctrine in most legal systems and its direct relevance to transnational commercial ventures,
there is little doubt that it should figure as an established part of the
evolving lex mercatoria. ICC arbitrators have assumed a stringent
and rigorous posture on force majeure questions.3 6 Unlike FrenchCanadian courts,3 7 ICC arbitrators require that all of the traditional
elements of the doctrine be satisfied in order to trigger its application,
namely, that the event in question be unforeseeable, irresistible, and
external to the party invoking the defense. For example, in some ICC
awards, arbitrators have ruled that fluctuations in exchange controls
do not constitute force majeure because the controls (and, presumably, the possibility that they would fluctuate) existed at the time the
contract was made; consequently, the fluctuations were neither irresistible nor unforseeable3 8
Such determinations reflect ICC arbitrators' commitment to the
pacta sunt servanda doctrine and the presumption that international
commercial parties are aware of the risks involved in transactions.
An overly flexible approach might destabilize transactions by making
performance less predictable. As a matter of commercial usage, contracting parties should have the foresight to provide for appropriate
note 25, Sentence No. 1512, at 904; 101 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 1703, at 894;
102 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2139, at 917; 102 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence

No. 2139, at 929; 107 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 3093/3100, at 951.
36. See supra note 35.
37. See Azard, La force majeure dilictuelle et contractuelle dans le droit civil qudbecois,
25 RFvUE Du BARREAU 357 (1965); see also ArbitralAdjudication, supra note 2, at 105-09.
38. See, eg., 107 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 3093/3100, at 951.

ARBITRATION AND REASONED AWARDS

1985]

contractual stipulations against the usual hazards of international
trading. It seems that, under ICC arbitral adjudication, events disruptive of the performance of a contract will constitute force majeure
only when they render that performance absolutely impossible. Even
in circumstances found to amount to force majeure, the existence of
the defense will not necessarily excuse the invoking party from performance; rather, the usual effect of a finding of force majeure is to
suspend temporarily the performance of the contractual obligation
during the existence of the event. 39 This rule contrasts sharply with
national courts' usual solution to the same question, 40 and illustrates
that ICC arbitrators have adapted the rule to the exigencies of international trade.
In addition to rulings pertaining to the arbitral process itself (for
example, the jurisdictional authority of the tribunal, the rules of interpretation regarding the arbitration clause, and the standing of the
State to arbitrate), 41 ICC awards have articulated rules relating to situations involving defective consent, unilateral rescission, and the measurement of damages.42 On these matters, the reasoning is consistent
with the elaboration of the other rules and incorporates the presumptions applying to international commercial parties.
5. Stature of the Rules
Skeptics of the process might argue that the authoritative basis of
this would-be ICC arbitral decisional law is too limited to allow for
the elaboration of comprehensive norms; this law merely reflects what
ICC arbitrators think are necessary rules in international commerce.
Moreover, it might be argued that giving arbitrators such discretion
in elaborating rules is fraught with potential difficulties (including
possibly unjustified departures from the would-be established rules).
ICC arbitration, however, is one of the most effective and most often
used forms of institutional arbitration in the international area; 3
given the status of ICC arbitration, the norms elaborated above probably reflect the inception of a majority trend rather than a set of rules
founded upon a questionable predicate. The fact that awards have
been so consistent and predictable in the statement of these basic prin39. 101

CLUNET,

supra note 25, Sentence No. 1703, at 894.

40. See Azard supra note 37.

41. See, ag., 103 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 1434, at 978; 103 CLUNET, supra
note 25, Sentence No. 2531, at 997; 105 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 1704, at 977;
109 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 3281, at 990.
42. See, eg., 101 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 1990, at 897; 101 CLUNET, supra
note 25, Sentence No. 2103, at 902; 102 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2216, at 917;
102 CLUNET, supra note 25, Sentence No. 2139, at 929.
43. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON supra note 24.
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ciples should minimize apprehension regarding possible arbitrator deviance and irregularity.
In international arbitration, the key to successful implementation, either as to procedure or substance, always has been, and continues to be, anchoring the determination in a consensus, which in turn
is founded upon an understanding of the needs of the community of
international merchants. ICC arbitrators are well aware of the process and appear to read its needs accurately. ICC arbitral law would
be valid at least for advanced Western commercial parties who regularly submit to ICC arbitration, and there are indications that an even
wider group of commercial parties are referring to and invoking ICC
arbitration."
The existence or desirability of this emerging arbitral law is not
being questioned. The main source of concern, rather, centers upon a
more technical consideration, namely, the implications of the elaboration of these substantive rules upon the jurisdictional authority of international arbitrators. Does it imply that they all rule, at least to
some extent, as amiables compositeurs (arbitrators authorized to abate
the strictness of the law in favor of natural equity), a status which
allows them to disregard both substantive and procedural legal rules if
they so choose, except those having a public policy character, and to
resolve the dispute according to equitable considerations or according
to their own convictions? If so, what would happen to the arbitrators'
rule-making authority if the parties specifically provided
that the arbi45
tral tribunal was not to rule in amiable composition?
These questions undeniably raise significant issues, but a fully
comprehensive answer requires a review of current arbitral decisional
law outside the scope of this article. A partial response, however, exists in the consideration of the effects of an agreement to submit disputes to international institutional arbitration. For instance, it could
be argued that the jurisdictional authority of the arbitral tribunal
under such an agreement arises simultaneously from the given terms
of reference and the institution which holds the arbitration as well as
the context in which the arbitration takes place. The parties' engage44. Id.
45. See Goldman, La Lex Mercatoriadans les contratset l'arbitrageinternationaux rdalit et perspectives, 106 CLUNET, supra note 25, at 476; see also Dehollain v. Dellohain, Cour
d'appel, Jan. 7, 1963, [1963] REv. ARB. 21, reprintedin 83-1 GAZETtE DU PALAIS 435 (1963);
E.
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ment in a transnational commercial venture and invocation of the international arbitral process constitute an implied submission to the
law which governs all transnational commercial ventures.
The application of any law designated by the parties must be
tempered, as a matter of usual practice, by reference to commercial
usage, which now is being progressively formalized into the basic tenets of the lex mercatoria. In any given international arbitration, the
arbitrators can modify provisions of the governing law and adapt
them to the particular contours of international transactions. In brief,
the parties' agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under an international contract implies that, in addition to any other specific provisions stipulated by the parties, the general commercial practices of the
community of international merchants will apply to the resolution of
disputes. This implied jurisdictional authority, to invoke Professor
David's remark regarding the evolution of international arbitration
generally, is neither amiable composition properly speaking nor a ruling according to law in its usual acceptation; rather, it demonstrates
that a specially-created, innovative, and substantive adjudicatory basis
applies in the area of international arbitration.
III.

A.

ADVOCATING THE ADOPTION OF REASONED AWARDS

Preliminary Observations

The following argument needs to be considered in the context of
a number of preliminary observations. First, reasoned international
arbitral awards would provide a better basis for the elaboration of a
common law of international transactions than national court decisions for the same reasons that made arbitration the premier remedy
for transnational commercial disputes. Arbitral tribunals are neutral
with respect to domestic legal traditions and interests; they are usually guided by the rules of international centers for institutional arbitration. They have a true, albeit private and unofficial, international
stature. Ordinarily, these tribunals refer to trade usages and customs
and apply the governing law flexibly with reference to commercial
practices. Expertly qualified adjudicators can adapt general legal
principles more readily to complex commercial realities than judges,
who by their training and experience may attach more importance to
doctrinal considerations in the application of the law.4 6
Second, the recommendation that follows regarding the render46. The advantages derived from flexibility, expertise and pragmatism may be lessened
by the fact that arbitral tribunals may not have a sense of their own international and precedential stature. Arbitrators may be more concerned with reaching a resolution of the particular dispute before them. Such an attitude, however, is not necessarily absent from judicial
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ing of awards with reasons is made merely in a preliminary fashion
and at a general, systemic level. A conclusive view on this issue
would require a comprehensive study of all the available awards,
which is properly the subject of further research. Pending definitive
empirical research, a practice of reasoned awards at the transnational
level is a logical outgrowth of the comparative domestic and international development of arbitral law, and a potentially fruitful means by
which to derive substantive norms for international contract law without compromising the remedial effectiveness of the arbitral process. 7
B.

The Substance of the Recommendation

The perception of arbitration as a fundamentally consensual and
private process of adjudication dominated by the principle of party
autonomy militates against formulating a mandatory requirement of
reasoned awards. The presumptive approach (favoring though not requiring reasoned awards) adopted in both the European Convention
and the UNCITRAL rules may be the strongest statement that
should be made in this regard." The viability of arbitration essentially resides in a type of transnational pragmatism and cooperation.
Given that attitude, a less than mandatory rule for reasoned awards
would be sensible since it would not impede (but would also not compel) the articulation of the basic substance of a lex mercatoria if such
an objective were in the interests of the international commercial
community.49

If the presumptive rule of rendering international awards with
reasons is adopted, the enforcement of such awards by national courts
might mean that these courts would give their approval not only to
the procedure which gave rise to the award and the arbitrability of its
subject matter, but also to the reasoning the award contains on its
merits. The latter facet of the enforcement process certainly would
not make a full review on the merits necessary; merits supervision
rulings, and the dictates of proper adjudication may require a larger perspective on the part of
the arbitral tribunals.
47. Moreover, the recommendation as to reasoned awards is made with an eye to the
realities of international practice in this area. International arbitrations usually are conducted
with sophisticated legal representation on both sides. Many of the legal counsel involved are
trained in the common law tradition, and civilian attorneys are familiar with the concept of
unejurisprudencedtablie ou constante. In all likelihood, the practice of rendering awards with
reasons (reasons that are generally consistent with prior adjudicatory determinations) would
mirror the way in which the case has been presented to the arbitral tribunal. This approach
(which applies in contemporary practice) has not made international arbitration any less desirable as an alternative dispute resolution process.
48. See ArbitralAdjudication, supra note 2, at 103.
49. Id.
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could be achieved on grounds akin to the flexible procedural review
that currently applies. Moreover, validation of the awards by national courts in enforcement proceedings would provide greater precedential value in subsequent arbitrations. As Professor Cremades
states, "[t]rade usage and custom, as interpreted in arbitration
awards, have had the effect of law because such awards are judicially
enforceable."' 5° Similar to the consensus on arbitration as a transnational remedy, the support of national legal systems would legitimate
the emerging rules. A more dramatic process, such as an international commercial court which reviews the reasoning in arbitral
awards, would be impractical and self-defeating, 51 given the attendant
jurisdictional problems and the experience with such institutions in
the public international law sector. Moreover, the creation of such a
separate, supra-national administrative apparatus might make transnational arbitration less attractive as a remedial process.
A system of reasoned awards would go far in harmonizing and
unifying the law in a given and special area of activity. It also would
create a substantive analogue to the special procedural regime applied
to international arbitration and thereby further "a-nationalize" the
process. Finally, such a system would illustrate the full value of the
comparative methodology by establishing a transnational legal regime
for commercial dealings.
IV.
A.

A

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE RECOMMENDATION

Arguments Against Reasoned Awards

A number of arguments can be made against the rendering of
awards with reasons. In addition to the historical factors which fostered the contrary practice,5 2 the rendering of such awards might prolong arbitral proceedings and increase their costs. Moreover, the
proposed practice might exceed or even contravene the expectations
of the parties who might only want to obtain a disposition of their
case rather than a court-like ruling on the matter. The principle of
party autonomy, however, seems to obviate the possibility of such
negative consequences. Since the proposed regime would create only
a presumption that awards be rendered with reasons, the parties could
always defeat that presumption by stipulating in their agreement to
the contrary.
As applied in these circumstances, however, the party autonomy
rule raises other problems. First, it presumes that the parties can
50. Cremades, supra note 21, at 534.
51. Id at 533-34.
52. See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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agree, either at the time of contracting or during the arbitral proceeding, that reasons be excluded from the eventual award. Adding an
area of possible disagreement to the process could encourage the use
of dilatory tactics and ultimately undermine its viability. Second, allowing for party prerogative (a necessary and irreducible feature of
arbitration) leaves the emergence and evolution of the lex mercatoria
through reasoned awards to the discretion, whim and invention of the
contracting parties. What should happen if a significant number of
arbitration clauses exclude awards with reasons, and the remainder
provide for the exclusive application of a domestic law or laws? Since
the norms which might result from the process would be unpredictable, confused and incomplete, the so-called common law of international transactions would amount to a negligible body of ill-defined
and improperly established legal principles.
Other problems of implementation which are more practical in
nature can be anticipated. One of the salient problems centers upon
the creation of a system for reporting reasoned awards. Can or
should an appropriate clearinghouse reporter be established? In what
form and under whose authority? The gathering, systematizing and
availability of reasoned awards obviously is critical to the possible decisional law value of these awards. Systematic organization, however,
may give too much structure to a process which has flourished in a
looser and more decentralized framework. More importantly, the
need for collecting and disseminating reasoned awards ultimately
could come into conflict with the parties' desire to maintain the confidentiality of the arbitral process, a facet of the process which presumably attracts many parties involved in international commercial
ventures. Although a system of anonymous reporting could be established, the characteristics of the transaction as described in the award
might reveal the identity of the parties. Ultimately, the parties' refusal to have their award published would be controlling.
Assuming that a significant number of awards could be collected
and released for publication, should all awards be reported or should
a process of qualitative selection preclude some or many awards from
being reported? Would some awards be reported in full, while others
are included only in extract fashion, and yet others simply summarized? Who would make these potentially critical editorial decisions
and from where would an organization or person derive its authority?
Selective reporting of awards or the existence of unreported awards
also might give rise to other issues. What status should an arbitral
tribunal, empowered in a given case to render a reasoned award according to the principles of the emerging arbitral lex mercatoria,attribute to an award which is submitted by a party as relevant to the
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determination of the matter under consideration, but which either has
not been or is only partially reported? Should potential sources of the
emerging lex mercatoria be recognized if they fall outside the established system of reported awards?
Since there are as yet no comprehensive or well-established statutes regulating international commerce, reasoned awards may serve
no useful purpose in the international context. In fact, they may inhibit arbitral determinations and modify negatively and unjustifiably
the way in which international arbitrators rule. Moreover, the consensus position surrounding a given legal principle may vary from
case to case, with arbitrators referring to the particular facts of the
given dispute to disregard the otherwise applicable legal principle. Finally, even if principles were to emerge and be recognized, they may
be of such general character that they would have been acknowledged
as applicable rules without being codified in arbitral decisions.
Another possible issue of contention concerns the need for and
scope of judicial review. Domestic judicial confirmation of the substance of reasoned awards undoubtedly would confer a measure of
legitimacy to substantive international arbitral adjudication and possibly would enhance the persuasive effect of the awards. Essentially,
this domestic judicial function would parallel the role that national
courts have played, principally under the 1958 New York Convention, in validating arbitration as a procedural process for the resolution of international commercial disputes. Substantive arbitral
determinations would be anchored, to some extent, in the binding jurisdictional authority of domestic legal systems.
A number of basic objections can be levied at this aspect of the
proposal. First, regarding the more practical problems of implementation, if judicial review is deemed imperative, should it be the
equivalent of an ordinary appeal on a question of law? Or should it be
tantamount to a full de novo review covering both questions of fact
and law? If the arbitral tribunal rules in equity, would that eliminate
any possibility of substantive judicial recourse or could the court review the award on the basis of its equitable adjudicatory powers?
What if the arbitrators rule primarily according to commercial customs and trade usages, matters in which they are particularly expert?
Would a court of law have the necessary expertise to deal with such
an award? If arbitral precedents were binding, what would be the
result if the arbitral tribunal inadvertently failed to apply or consider
a given precedent, deliberately disregarded it under its equitable adjudicatory powers, or erroneously interpreted the prior ruling? Finally,
would substantive judicial review be exercised in the rendering state
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by an action to set aside or would review be available solely in the
state of enforcement?
Second, the concept of judicial supervision of the merits of
awards is so antithetical to current perceptions of the international (or
even domestic) arbitral process (especially in France and the United
States)5 3 that the mere possiblity of having even a limited form of
judicial supervision could be viewed as completely undesirable. The
apprehension is that, once such a process is initiated, it may grow,
eventually resulting in much more judicial supervision of the merits,
and ultimately abrogate the viability of arbitration.
Further, if a parallel to the procedural regime under the New
York Convention 54 applies, would domestic courts be willing to engage in a substantive form of review that is basically cosmetic and
perfunctory except in the most egregious of cases? Courts might feel
that procedural and substantive approval of international arbitral
awards are two entirely different matters, that substantive affirmance
implicates their dignity and that of the national legal system, and that
no international convention suggests, mandates or legitimates such a
potentially compromising acquiescence. Given the current international consensus surrounding commercial arbitration, national courts
probably would not see review on the merits of reasoned international
arbitral awards as an open invitation to undermine an established and
very workable institution of private international commerce. The real
difficulty lies precisely in the national courts' perception of the systemic implications underlying the substantive approval of awards.
Finally, there is the problem of coordinating the possible elaboration of substantive norms through reasoned awards with international
efforts aimed at codifying principles of international law in international agreements. The recent Vienna Convention 55 on the international law of sales represents just such an attempt. What if a reasoned
award or a series of them conflicts with, seems to deviate from, or
proposes some modification of a legal principle contained in an international instrument on substantive law which has been ratified by a
majority of states prior to the rendering of the award? Such a situation would likely impede rather than promote the development of the
lex mercatoria. The law governing international transactions, then,
would be anchored in an unruly and chaotic base.
53. Id. at 45-61, 65-84.
54. See generally Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269 (1979).
55. J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONvENTION (1982).
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Arguments FavoringReasoned Awards

After cataloguing all of these potential woes, one is tempted to
abandon any suggestion that the process of international commercial
arbitration be modified even slightly to achieve its normative potential. In fact, given these potential problems, one wonders whether the
attempt to generate substantive arbitral norms is at all desirable,
whether it would not cause more problems than it solves, and whether
tinkering with present procedures in this fashion might not result in
irreparable damage to the current integrity of the process. Despite
these misgivings, strong reasons exist to espouse a more balanced view
of the utility of reasoned awards in the current system.
1. The Needs of the International Process
In contradistinction to domestic U.S. arbitral practice where, for
example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) encourages
arbitrators to render, and the parties to agree to, awards without reasons,5 6 there is a greater need to instill a level of substantive predictability in international commercial transactions. Parties to
international contracts agree to arbitrate for a number of reasons; primary among them is the avoidance of local procedural rules or the
substantive law of either contracting party. Unfamiliarity with foreign law and the unfair advantage which can be anticipated from the
application of domestic procedures calls for a neutralization of the
entire dispute resolution process. In the private international setting,
the parties' desire is not to be outside the law, but rather to be governed by substantive and procedural provisions which are free of national bias and which are molded to the particular features of their sui
generis commercial relationship.
In this sense, the dispute resolution needs of commercial parties
in the international area differ quite markedly from the needs of their
domestic counterparts. Parties engaged in purely domestic commercial transactions seek expert adjudicators, an economical and expeditious way in which to terminate their conflict, and a system that
avoids what appears to be a costly and frustrating legal morass. Their
need for an alternate dispute resolution mechanism is not grounded
primarily in a concern for neutrality or in a perception that the application of an alien law will result in unfairness. They simply want a
56. Interview with Professor Suman Naresh, Arbitrator for the American Arbitration
Association, in New Orleans, Louisiana (July 7, 1984); see also AMERICAN ARBITRATION AsSOCIATION, A MANUAL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS (1959). "Arbitrators are not re-

quired to write opinions explaining reasons for their decisions. .

.

. [One] reason.., is that

written opinions might open avenues for attack on the award by the losing party." Id at 23.
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better (in the sense of quicker, less costly and more commercially realistic) way of dealing with disputes. In fact, the domestic law already
provides, and the parties expect to be governed by, a sophisticated and
adapted body of rules by which to regulate commercial relationships.
International merchants, on the other hand, need not only a process, but ultimately also a body of stable and increasingly refined legal
principles which properly regulates their specific types of transactions. A fully viable process of alternate dispute resolution must accommodate this two-fold adjudicatory need for neutrality. In this
regard, the substance of article 1496 of the French Decree of May 12,
198 1, 7 perhaps best expresses the distinctive requirements of the international arbitral process when that process is compared to its domestic analogue. Article 1496 provides that international arbitrators
must apply the substantive law chosen by the parties and, absent a
party choice, those substantive legal rules they deem appropriate.
The provision concludes by stating that, regardless of who makes the
choice or what choice is made, the arbitrators must take commercial
usage into account in applying the relevant law.
Under this regime, the parties have basically unlimited discretion
in choosing a governing law: they can select a given national law,
freeze its provisions at a particular time, exclude some of its content,
combine it with the.substance of another national law, or even invent
their own rules. When the parties have not exercised their prerogative, the arbitrators conceivably could do the same. The important
point here is that any application of substantive legal rules must be
tempered by reference to commercial usage, a factor which allows the
arbitrators a relatively large degree of flexibility even in interpreting
and applying the legal rules and principles from a given domestic law.
The French provision is remarkable in the sense that it reads well the
current needs and anticipates the trends of private international commercial dispute resolution. In effect, it amounts to an implied recognition that transnational commercial ventures need to be governed by
a substantive law which transcends national legal boundaries and
which adapts to the needs and requirements of such transactions as
they evolve in the dynamics of international trade.
The rendering of reasoned awards could assist the effort to establish a common law of international transactions, and could introduce
a greater degree of substantive predictability in the dispute resolution
process. In an organic and evolutionary sense, the elaboration of normative rules of law can be seen as the normal and logical systemic
outgrowth of the development of the international arbitral process.
57.

1981 J.O. 1401; see also supra note 2.
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The volume and complexity of cases are increasing, and institutions
(such as the ICC and AAA)5" have been created to refine and develop
the process. Greater attention now should be focused upon the substantive aspects of international commercial dispute resolution
through arbitration.
2. The Consensus Surrounding the Process
The skepticism expressed-concerning the application of the
party autonomy principle, the establishment of a reporting system for
awards, and the coordination of the emerging arbitral norms and the
provisions of international conventions codifying substantive legal
rules-seems unjustified not only in light of the needs of the international process, but also in regard to the consensus which sustains and
nourishes it. These potential problems are not intractable, and their
statement fails to recognize that aspect of arbitral adjudication which
has been essential to its success in the international area. A process of
alternate dispute resolution can be viable only in a setting in which it
is needed and to which it can be adapted. By definition, an alternative
to judicial adjudication will not be successful where coercive public
jurisdictional authority remains necessary to the effective resolution of
disputes. Commercial parties need not and cannot be forced to agree
to arbitration. Whether the substitute for judicial adjudication is arbitration, mediation or conciliation, none will work unless the parties
perceive the utility and value of the process and support it as an alternate means of dispute resolution.
Accordingly, the apprehension that the party autonomy principle
might destroy the norm-generating capacity of reasoned international
awards (when the parties in their agreement exclude the rendering of
a reasoned award or provide for the exclusive application of a domestic substantive law) ignores the principal attribute of arbitration: the
wide and deeply rooted international consensus which surrounds the
process. It also ignores the possiblity of expanding the international
utility of the process by having it fill a troublesome and gaping substantive void. Party support could considerably diminish, if not eliminate, the problems of implementation no matter how great they may
appear. Parties engaged in the process of international commercial
arbitration might perceive reasoned awards as in their best self-interest. Such a procedure not only would make the arbitrators more accountable, but also would add an element of substantive predictability
to the resolution of the parties' particular dispute and to the process
as a whole.
58. See ArbitralAdjudication, supra note 2, at 92-97.
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Having reasoned awards might increase the duration and costs of
the proceeding. Moreover, parties who are engaged in litigation are
notoriously sensitive to such considerations and tend to be more
short-sighted when it comes to seeing the long-range benefits of the
larger enterprise. Such observations, however, again minimize the
particular features and needs of international arbitral adjudication.
ICC institutional arbitration,5 9 for example, is renowned for its expense and length: fees are established according to a percentage of the
amount in controversy and an average proceeding typically lasts for
approximately eighteen months.' Yet international commercial parties refer to and invoke ICC arbitration with increasing frequency.6 1
The length and cost of proceedings have not dissuaded international
merchants involved in complex, multi-million dollar transactions
from having recourse to ICC institutional arbitration. In any event,
the rendering of reasoned awards-a practice which already is being
followed quite consistently in ICC institutional arbitrations 6 2 -would
not add an inordinate amount of time to existing procedures and the
cost would already be included in the percentage of the anticipated
overall costs.
Arguably, parties to an arbitration may never be, or may not
foresee the possibility of being, involved in another transnational commercial venture leading to arbitration. Their interest in the process
may be localized to their particular dispute and may not extend to the
systemic integrity of the process. Again, the experience of ICC arbitration is both apposite and opposite.6 3 ICC officials state that there is
a 90% voluntary compliance rate with ICC awards," indicating not
only that ICC institutional arbitration is perceived as arriving at satisfactory results, but also that parties want to uphold the viability of a
process which they perceive as necessary and useful to the general
commercial community.
A similar cooperation founded upon consensus might arise to
validate and uphold the practice of rendering reasoned awards. International commercial parties might view an emerging set of rules as
beneficial, providing at least a moderately predictable substantive basis for the growing complexity of their transactions. In order to gain
this advantage-to obtain a principled basis for the determination of
their dispute and to support an emerging practice in the community
59. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 24, pt. III, § 19.04, at 107.
60. Id., pt. I, §§ 1.01-1.08, at 1-15.
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id.
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of international merchants-parties in all likelihood would not exclude the use of reasoned awards or provide for the exclusive application of a domestic law to their transaction. In any event, the latter
prospect of exclusive application of domestic law is rather untoward
in the international arbitral process given the need for adjudicatory
neutrality. As noted above,6 5 unless the parties specifically provide
otherwise, international arbitrators probably would mitigate the influence of the domestic law by taking commercial usage into account.
One objection, however, is that the essential basis for party compliance with awards is absent in acquiescence to reasoned awards.
Moreover, a high level of voluntary compliance with ICC awards may
not reflect a party perception that the remedial process which generated the award needs to be maintained, but rather indicates a concern
that the on-going contractual relationship which gave rise to the dispute be salvaged or that the viability of other such relationships in the
future be preserved notwithstanding that a particular conflict arose at
a given time. Any accurate reading of this phenomenon, however,
must be multi-factorial in character. If parties who voluntarily comply with awards were interested primarily or exclusively in maintaining their existing or future contractual relationships, arbitration
would be no less necessary to the resolution of disputes which might
arise after the initial arbitration. One of the recurring conclusions of
any analysis of international arbitral adjudication is that it is difficult
to separate the availability of the arbitral process from the viability of
international commerce generally.66
Although reasons of expediency and implementation exist, it is
difficult to understand why international commercial parties would
want to discourage or impede the practice of reasoned awards. These
parties, even for reasons purely of self-interest, are concerned with the
evolution and dynamics of the arbitral process. Reasoned awards are
a stepping stone to the definition of customary trade usages and the
elaboration of general international commercial law principles, and
hence are a bridge to a greater degree of substantive adjudicatory predictability. Certainly, some element of substantive predictability
would be preferable in the context of multi-million dollar transactions
than ad hoe determinations reached without any attempt at articulating a basic rationale.
Given the complexity of the debate, it might be appropriate to
have the preference of practitioners and the arbitral institutions guide
party choice on this matter. In current practice, the practitioners who
65. See supra text at and accompanying note 57.

66. See ArbitralAdjudication, supra note 2, at 58-59.
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represent arbitrating parties often refer to the substance of past
awards when attempting to guide the arbitral tribunal in its determination. The existing litigation practice could be combined, following
the example of the 1961 European Convention and the UNCITRAL
Rules, with a presumption in institutional rules that reasoned awards
would be rendered unless the parties specifically provide otherwise.
Such a procedure would strike a realistic balance between the need to
maintain the integrity of the party autonomy principle and the need
to allow arbitral institutions to refine and guide the existing process at
a larger systemic level. AAA and ICC rules, for example, already
contain provisions which limit the exercise of party autonomy (for
instance, in the appointment of arbitrators and the selection of an arbitral forum) once institutional arbitration has been chosen and invoked.67 The presumptive rule regarding reasoned awards would be a
mild variant on these more stringent provisions, and would constitute
essentially an innocuous way of determining whether reasoned awards
would be acceptable to the community of international merchants.
In conjunction with the presumption of giving reasons, a system
for reporting reasoned awards might be organized around the main
centers of institutional arbitration. Parties who have submitted their
dispute to institutional arbitration could be presented at the outset of
the process with an administrative document reminding them that the
rules of the institution favor the rendering of awards with reasons and
their publication. The administrative document would give the parties the option to empower the arbitral tribunal to render an award
with reasons and to authorize the arbitral institution to publish the
award on an anonymous basis in an official reporter. Assuming general compliance with this procedure, the staff of each institution
would then collect the awards and forward them to a commercial
publisher. The latter would organize the awards, place them in
chronological order and classify them according to subject matter
with an appropriate list of headnotes and an index.
It appears unlikely that a trend of awards would undermine efforts at embodying general commercial principles in international instruments. To the contrary, the general historical and contemporary
viability of international arbitration indicates that arbitral norms
would coincide with, supplement and update the provisions of international conventions. They would add the clarification of detail to
generally accepted and broadly gauged legal principles.
Finally, the question of the form and scope of the applicable judi67. I- at 92-93.
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cial review presents problems that are more difficult to resolve. 68 Obviously, any viable solution must somehow mediate between the need
to avoid returning to the old form of English judicial merits supervision and the equally pressing need somehow to legitimate the substance of the awards by anchoring that substance in the private
international law of a given national legal system. Use of recourse
provisions in contemporary national arbitration statutes and international agreements on arbitration could be of utility here by analogy.
These provisions essentially allow the setting aside of an award for a
technical excess of arbitral authority or a procedural due process violation based upon public policy. One could argue that a substantive
counterpart to the public policy exception, based upon procedural
considerations, should apply in terms of merits supervision. An
award therefore could be invalidated only if the merits violated a fundamental rule of substantive international public policy, such as a
human rights provision or a prohibition against corporate bribery.
One could also expand this to cover the erroneous application of a
basic legal principle which is common to most developed legal systems and is interpreted as having a particular meaning. This would
' 69
be the equivalent of the U.S. rule of "manifest disregard of the law.
Limited court supervision of the merits usually in the country of
enforcement would result in a type of negative affirmance of the reasoned substance of the award: the narrow determination that the reasoning in the award does not contain a "manifest disregard of the
law" or violate an essential stricture of international public policy.
Much like the public policy exception in the New York Convention,
this ground for review would cover only the most egregious of situations. Court affirmance would not legitimate the substance of the
award in an international sense, but would only lend more weight to
its credibility. Any ultimate conclusion as to the normative status of
the award would be determined by adjudicators in the international
arbitral process. Moreover, the two aspects of the proposed procedure-having reasoned international awards and having them be sub68. The stare decisis rule that should apply, however, is one which is more akin to U.S.
than English legal tradition. It is one in which the power of distinguishing cases from one
another is the basic rule rather than the exception. The substance of prior awards, in effect,
should be used as a type of general persuasive guidance for other arbitral adjudications, perhaps giving more meaningful definition to the concepts of "ruling according to substantive
legal principles" and "in accordance with commercial custom and trade usages." An arbitral

adjudication could not then turn merely on amorphous vagaries, and the process would benefit
from its specially articulated corpus of law.
69. See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 2, at 48-50. In applying that rule, courts in the
United States have held that "a manifest disregard of the law" appears to exist only where the
arbitral tribunal correctly states the applicable law and then ignores it entirely in its ruling.
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ject to limited national court supervision of the merits upon
enforcement-eventually should reinforce one another, fostering the
anationalism and autonomy of the arbitral process and making issues
which surface in its regard an authentic part of the forum's policy
toward private international law matters. As a corpus of arbitral decisional law develops, courts of enforcement are less likely to evaluate
the reasoning of awards from a primarily national perspective, and
will begin to anchor their assessments in the substance of prior
awards. Thus, the development of the process will entail a reduction
in the problems that might surface at the inception of the procedure,
specifically in terms of the hazards normally associated with judicial
review of the merits of awards in the context of arbitration.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Given the scope and character of the current ICC arbitral decisional law, as well as the experience with maritime arbitration, it
seems that reasoned awards are at least worth experimentation. They
appear to be a necessary first step toward elaborating the basic tenets
of a common law of international transactions. The use of a comparative methodology with international implications is the most appropriate means by which to achieve that substantive end. The recourse
to such a methodology would require some degree of legal sophistication on the part of the arbitrators and the representatives of the parties. The proposed model also assumes that the arbitral tribunal
would have the power to rule according to a general adjudicatory
mandate that includes a general "respect for law" and refers to customary international commercial and trade practices. One can assume that most international arbitral adjudications, by definition,
involve arbitrators who have an internationalist orientation, and that
parties want their disputes resolved according to a neutral substantive
basis that mirrors the sui generis characteristics of their transaction.
At this stage, the essential problem relates to the implementation
rather than to the content of the recommended procedure. In keeping
with the general trend of international arbitral adjudication, the most
effective approach is to leave adoption of the practice of reasoned
awards to the consensus of the international commercial community.
International merchants will decide whether to reverse the customary
procedure of having unreasoned awards, a practice based on a misperception of its historical antecedents and a confusion as to its acknowledged status. Although there should be little opposition to
following the approach suggested by the European Convention and
the UNCITRAL rule in this area, once a consensus has emerged it
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should perhaps be codified in an appropriate international instrument.
This instrument should contain a reference to the judicial supervision
of the substance of reasoned awards on the basis of a limited substantive public policy ground, thereby creating by implication a presumption that awards basically satisfy such a standard. The important
practical consideration is how to have such awards published either in
a comprehensive fashion or on a selective basis in keeping with the
current practice regarding ICC awards, while maintaining the anonymity of the parties. The awards, as in the area of maritime arbitration, can provide substantive guidance for subsequent arbitral
tribunals ruling on similar questions.
Perhaps the most efficient and effective way of integrating judicial review of reasoned awards into current international practice
would be to propose an addition to article V of the 1958 New York
Convention. In its present form, article V allows a court in a requested state to refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award on the basis of narrow technical grounds and larger, albeit
restrictively interpreted, substantive grounds. Article V(1) lists five
bases for denial of enforcement, including excess of arbitral authority
in the award, lack of basic due process in the proceeding giving rise to
the award, and other major irregularities regarding the arbitral procedure. Article V(2) allows denial on the basis of inarbitrability of the
subject matter of the award in the country of enforcement or for the
reason that "the recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy" of the enforcing jurisdiction. It should
be emphasized that both of the available defenses to enforcement
under article V(2) of the Convention have been narrowly construed by
a vast majority of national courts.70
An additional clause could be added to the substance of article
V(2) to allow for either a full or partial denial of enforcement when
the content of a reasoned award contains a manifest violation of international public policy or of law. For example, such a clause might
read:
When a foreign arbitral award contains reasons for its determination, the court of enforcement shall, without substituting its judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal or otherwise
impinging upon the tribunal's adjudicatory authority, engage in a general scrutiny of the reasoning to determine
whether the reasons given conform to the fundamental dic70. See, eg., Sanders, Consolidated Commentary on Court Decisions on the New York
Convention 1958, 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 231 (1979).
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tates of international public policy and do not represent a
manifest disregard of such public policy or of law.
In the event that the court of enforcement finds that the
reasoning of an otherwise enforceable award contains a
manifest disregard of international public policy or of law, it
may either sever the award from its reasons and grant enforcement to the award alone or deny enforcement to the
award on the basis that a grant of enforcement to such an
award would be contrary to the public policy of the
jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the proposed language will generate considerable
debate. It attempts to integrate a procedure into current practice that
historically has been deemed antithetical to the autonomy of the arbitral process. Moreover, in keeping with the latter view, it raises the
possibility that an award that satisfies all other procedural and substantive requirements could be denied enforcement on the basis of a
merits review. Pending a dialogue on the question, it is submitted
that the incorporation of the proposed language into the existing
framework of the New York Convention would represent a considerable gain acquired at minimal costs.
In practical and theoretical terms, a denial of enforcement or
even a severance of the award from its reasons on the basis of the
proposed language would be very unlikely. First, the requested court
can only engage in a "general scrutiny" of the reasoning, meaning
that its consideration, for all intents and purposes, is limited to a perusal of the reasoning. Second, judicial objection to the reasoning can
only be achieved when the facial consideration reveals a "manifest
disregard" of international public policy or of law. Obviously, such a
standard of review can only be triggered in the most egregious of
cases where, for example, the arbitral tribunal has engaged in a clearly
irrational application of the law to the facts, or ignored completely
and without reason its own statement of the applicable law in deciding the case. Third, the favorable presumption toward the enforcement of awards implied in the New York Convention and the
receptive and nearly uniform disposition of national courts in regard
to that presumption, renders improbable a very stringent form of review which would ultimately undermine the entire process. Fourth,
the opinions contained in the reasoned awards rendered by ICC arbitrators indicate that there is little cause for concern as to the quality
of the reasoning given by international arbitrators, many of whom are
distinguished jurists.
In some, albeit rare, circumstances, a court may find that the
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reasoning in an award, on its face, is particularly questionable and
may be fundamentally improper. The requested court might conclude
that the discrepancy with acceptable juridical standards constitutes a
manifest disregard of law or is violative of international public policy.
The court, however, may agree with the result reached by the arbitral
tribunal. In these instances, the court of enforcement could sever the
reasons from the award, refusing to give its seal of approval to the
opinion and nonetheless enforce the award. Where the reasoning is
blatantly in violation of either international public policy or of law
and compels the determination in the award, the court may refuse to
enforce the award altogether on the basis of the domestic public policy exception to enforcement. Such an outcome can be justified on
two grounds. On the one hand, a similar determination may have
been reached without the addition of the merits review language if the
result contained in the award was itself offensive to the jurisdiction's
public policy. On the other hand, more importantly, an egregious departure from the usual high quality international adjudication
achieved through arbitration should be censored primarily for the
benefit and integiity of the arbitral process. The likelihood that nonconforming awards and instances of denial will be a rarity makes the
suggested addition to article V of the New York Convention an effective reconciliation of the competing and equally-pressing needs to
avoid unwarranted judicial supervision of the merits of reasoned international awards and to provide some national court support for
and general validation of the emerging arbitral decisional law.
Finally, the use of reasoned awards in contemporary ICC practice coincides with a rise in the general popularity of ICC arbitration,
especially among commercial parties who traditionally were not a significant percentage of the ICC's clientele. This includes parties from
Middle Eastern, African, Far Eastern, Latin American and Eastern
European countries. 71 The expansion of ICC institutional arbitration
to include the newer, non-Western participants in international trade
certainly indicates that the ICC proffers a remedial process which is
becoming universally acknowleged as the vehicle by which to resolve
transnational commercial disputes. While the use of reasoned awards
may be quite separate from this expansion, there is room for speculation that the ICC's practice of rendering awards with reasons may
have fostered the entry of a larger and more diverse group of international merchants in the process. Given the vast ideological, political
71. See Paulsson, Arbitration Under the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DIsPuTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 235, 255-58 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984) (Sixth Sokol Colloquium).
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and legal disparity among parties from the North-South and EastWest axes, there is an increasing need for parties to supervise the arbitrators' basis of decision and for a neutral governing law that is detached from national preoccupations and mirrors the true economic
realities of transnational commerce. Reasoned awards, whether perceived as a cause or an effect of more diverse participation in world
trade, are evidently instrumental in the achievement of a greater form
of neutrality, which is mandated by the increased diverse
participation.
By integrating more comprehensively into current practice the
procedure of rendering awards with reasons, it seems that other commercial parties from every region of the world community would be
drawn to international commercial arbitral adjudication. As a consequence, the process eventually should come to satisfy its substantive
mission and fulfill the "aspiration" toward a new type of law that it
embodies, the lex mercatoria.

